CCA-P start here · Trap gym · Trap 7

Act with the user's own access

D3 · IntegrationGuide lines 3.2

At a glance: An agent that serves people should reach data with each person's own scoped access, not a shared all-powerful account; use a service identity only when no person is behind the request.

Authentication proves who someone is (signing in). Authorization decides what they may reach. They are different gaps: signing users in does not stop an agent from showing them data they may not see, if the agent fetches everything with one powerful account.

That shared account is the trap. It is quick to set up, but it means the agent can reach anything for anyone, and the only thing deciding what a user sees is the model, which is not an access control. The fix is delegated access: the agent calls the system with a token that carries the signed-in user's own permissions (for example through OAuth, which remote MCP servers support), so the system itself refuses what the user could not open.

Two lookalikes: when no person is behind the request, such as a scheduled job, there is no one to delegate from, so the job gets its own narrowly scoped service identity. And when users are not signed in at all, authentication has to come first, because authorization needs a known identity.

Change one fact

A university's research-office assistant helps staff find grant documents on the shared drive. It searches with one service account that can read every folder. Staff sign in with single sign-on, and folder permissions differ by department. A lecturer received text from another department's confidential budget. What should the architect change?

Words in the stem that signal this trap

Rule to remember: If a person is behind the request, act with that person's own scoped access. If no person is, give the job its own narrow identity. If you do not know who is asking, fix sign-in first.

Practice

Practice 7.1 · Choose one.

A hospital's scheduling assistant lets clinicians check and book operating-theatre slots. It calls the scheduling system with an integration account that sees every specialty's lists, although each clinician's own login sees only their specialty. A surgeon received another specialty's patient list. Clinicians already sign in with single sign-on. What should the architect change?

  1. Call the scheduling system with each clinician's own delegated token.
  2. Pass the clinician's specialty to the model and tell it to filter the results.
  3. Record which clinician viewed which patient list in a detailed audit log.
  4. Create one account per specialty, chosen by the specialty typed in the chat.
Show answer

Answer: A. The deciding facts: clinicians are signed in, and the scheduling system already enforces per-specialty access. A delegated token lets it apply those rules.

  • A ✅ Call the scheduling system with each clinician's own delegated token.
  • B ❌ Works most of the time, but the model is filtering data it should never have received.
  • C ❌ Works for accountability, but it records the exposure instead of preventing it.
  • D ❌ Works if the specialty were trusted, but anyone can type another specialty's name.
Practice 7.2 · Choose one.

A bank has two legal entities, retail and investment, with a strict information barrier between them. Every employee belongs to exactly one, and all documents within an entity are open to its own staff. The bank's assistant searches one shared index with a crawler account. Staff sign in with single sign-on. What design fits best?

  1. Keep the shared index and add a prompt rule naming the barrier.
  2. Keep the shared index and log each answer with the asker's entity.
  3. Build one index per entity, and search only the user's own entity's index.
  4. Store each document's full access list on its chunks and filter every query.
Show answer

Answer: C. The deciding fact: access follows a clean split by entity, with everything open inside each one. Separate indexes, chosen from the signed-in user's entity, are simpler and enough.

  • A ❌ Works for tone, but a prompt is not an access control across a legal barrier.
  • B ❌ Works for auditing, but it records breaches instead of stopping them.
  • C ✅ Build one index per entity, and search only the user's own entity's index.
  • D ❌ Works, and would win if permissions varied document by document, but here they do not.
Practice 7.3 · Choose one.

A note-taking assistant saves meeting summaries into each employee's cloud drive using the employee's own OAuth token. When it was set up, it requested full drive access, including deleting files and sharing them outside the company. It only ever creates new documents in one folder. What should the architect change?

  1. Switch to one service account with write access to every employee's drive.
  2. Request a narrower scope that lets it create files in the notes folder.
  3. Keep full access, and log every deletion and external share it makes.
  4. Keep full access, and ask the employee to confirm any external share.
Show answer

Answer: B. The deciding fact: the assistant only creates documents in one folder. Delegated access is right, but the scope it asks for should match the role.

  • A ❌ Works technically, but a shared account reaches every drive and loses per-user limits.
  • B ✅ Request a narrower scope that lets it create files in the notes folder.
  • C ❌ Works for audit, but it watches powers the assistant never uses.
  • D ❌ Works when the role sometimes needs sharing, but this one never does.

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